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Recent Developments

Degren v. State:
Failure to Prevent the Sexual Abuse of a Child, When It Is Reasonably Possible to
Act, Qualifies As Sexual Abuse Under Maryland's Child Abuse Statute
By Sean E. Kreiger

I

n a unanimous decision, the
Court ofAppeals ofMaryland
held that an adult responsible for the
supervision ofa child is guilty ofsexual
abuse when they fail to prevent the
sexual molestation of the child.
Degren v. State, 352 Md. 400, 722
A.2d 887 (1999). The defendant's
conviction for child abuse was upheld
in Degren because of her failure to
stop or report the child abuse of a
minor under her supervision when it
was reasonably possible for her to act.
In so holding, the court of appeals
refined the child abuse statute and
made it clear that a supervising adult
has an affirmative duty to prevent the
abuse of children under their care.
Sharon Degren ("Degren") and
the mother oftwelve-year-old Jennifer
B. ("Jennifer") agreed that Jennifer
would stay at Degren's house, under
Degren'ssupervision. Id at405, 722
A.2d at 889. During her stay, Jennifer
was sexually abused by Degren's
husband, Nick Degren (''Nick''), and
his friend, Richard Dobsha ("Rick").
Id at 406-07, 722 A.2d at 890. In
some instances, Degren was present
in the same room when Jennifer was
sexually abused, occasionally
watching the sexual abuse from the
comer of the bed. Id Nevertheless,
Degren did not attempt to prevent the
sexual abuse, or contact the
authorities. Id. Degren was
subsequently convicted by ajury in
the Circuit Court for Charles County

of four counts of child abuse, and
sentenced to four concurrent ten-year
sentences. Id at 404, 722 A.2d at
889. On appeal, the Court of Special
Appeals of Maryland affirmed the
conviction, and the Court of Appeals
of Maryland granted certiorari to
address the issue ofwhether the child
abuse statute includes an act of
omission or failure to prevent abuse.
Id
The court of appeals began its
analysis by interpreting Maryland's
child abuse statute to determine
whether the failure to prevent sexual
abuse of a minor was an act that
constituted child abuse. Id. at 408,
722 A.2d at 891 (citing MD. ANN.
CODE art. 27, § 35C (1996)). The
relevant part of the statute states that
"a parent or other person who has
permanent or temporary care or
responsibility for the supervision of a
child ... who causes the abuse to the
child is guilty of a felony." Id at 408,
722 A.2d at 891 (quoting MD. ANN.
CODE art. 27, § 35C(b)(1) (1996)).
The court interpreted the
meaning and scope of the statute by
reviewing cases where it had applied
the statute. Id at 409, 722 A.2d at
891. The court noted one case in
which it held a mother guilty of
involuntary manslaughter for her failure
to protect her infant from repeated
abuse by her boyfriend. Id. at 40910, 722 A.2d at 891-92 (citing
Palmer v. State, 223 Md. 341, 353,

164A.2d467,474 (1960)). Yetin
another case, Pope v. State, the
court found a woman not guilty of
child abuse for her failure to stop the
mother from physically abusing her
child while they were in the
defendant's house. Id. at 415-16,
722 A.2d at 894-95 (citing Pope v.
State, 284 Md. 309, 318-20,396
A.2d 1054, 1060-62 (1979)). The
instant case was distinguished from
Pope, because in Pope, the court
found that there was no mutual
consent for the defendant to have
supervisory responsibility for the
child. Id Degren, on the other hand,
had agreed with Jennifer's mother to
care for Jennifer. Id The court found
that its rulings in these cases provided
a basis for convicting a person for
failure to prevent sexual abuse. Id.
To clarify that Degren's failure
to act qualified as sexual abuse, the
court next addressed the plain
meaning of the child abuse statute.
Id. at 418, 722 A.2d at 896. The
statute defmes sexual abuse as "any
act that involves sexual molestation
or exploitation ofa child." Id (quoting
MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, §
35C(a)(6)(i) (1996)). Degren's
contention on appeal was that her
actions did not qualify as sexual abuse
because she did not act in furtherance
of the abuse. Id This contention
prompted the court to define "act"
and "involves" as they relate to the
statute. Id The court considered
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outside sources because the definition
of "act" is not in the statute. Id.
According to Black's Law Dictionary
"an omission or failure to act may
constitute an act for the purpose of
criminal laws." Id. (quoting BLACK's
LAW DICTIONARY 25 (6thed. 1990)).
Furthermore, the court pointed out
that "act" is normally construed to
include omissions from a duty to act.

Id.
The court stated that the word
"involves," which modifies "act" in the
statute, "connotes a broad sense of
inclusion, such as an act relating to
sexual molestation or exploitation."
Id. In further support ofthe statutory
usage of "involves," the court
reviewed Merriam-Webster' s
Collegiate Dictionary and found that
"involves" means "to have an effect
on." Id. (quoting MERRIAMWEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY
617). Thus, according to the court,
"involves" serves as an extender
beyond sexual molestation or
exploitation to include "something
done by the accused that relates to
the molestation or exploitation." Id.
Moving beyond the issue of
statutory construction, the court
considered the legislative intent behind
the statute. Id. at 419-20, 722 A.2d
at 896-97. The court found the
legislative intent clear because the
introductory paragraph and purpose
clause of the statute stated that the
purpose of the statute was to protect
children. Id. (citing MD. ANN. CODE
art. 27, § 35C (1996)). Furthermore,
the court considered a 1974
amendment to the statute, which
added sexual abuse as a form of child
abuse. Id. The purpose of this
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extension was to expand the definition
of child abuse. Id. Thus, the court
concluded, the definition of child
abuse was intended to be open in
application, making Degren' s
contention that omissions were not
acts contradictory to the legislative
intent. Id.
Next, Degren argued that
because the "failure to act" language
was not added to the sexual abuse
provision, the statute was only
applicable for failure to intervene
during the physical abuse of a minor.
Id. at 421, 722 A.2d at 897. The
court rejected this argument and
stated that the definition of abuse does
not require physical injury for criminal
penalties, and that the 1973
amendment broadened coverage of
the entire statute to include failure to
act, regardless of whether the abuse
is physical or sexual. Id. After
considering these factors, the court
held that "the definition itself
encompasses what petitioner actually
did: the affirmative acts of watching
and failing to intervene in the rape."
Id. at 425, 722 A.2d at 899.
By allowing the conviction for
sexual abuse for an omission to act,
the court of appeals has extended the
coverage of the child abuse statute.
This praiseworthy decision will allow
the prosecution ofindividuals who do
not directly participate in abuse, but
who may reasonably prevent the
abuse and who have a responsibility
or duty to the child. This decision will
help to further extend penalties for
child abuse and thus provide a means
of prosecuting more participants in
this insidious crime.

